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CHAPTER 13
The Idea of a New Zimbabwe Post-Mugabe
Sylvester Marumahoko and Tinashe C. Chigwata
IntroductIon
Zimbabwe has gone through deep political, economic and social chal-
lenges for close to three decades. Once known as the shining light of 
Africa, Zimbabwe is now often known for dominating international head-
lines for the wrong reasons. In November 2017, the country experienced 
a radical change to the constitutional and political order, which brought 
an end to former President Robert Mugabe’s 37-year reign. Emmerson 
Mnangagwa, who was once Mugabe’s right-hand man, assumed leader-
ship of both the country and the ruling Zimbabwe African National 
Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). He was reelected in the July 2018 
harmonised elections, although under disputed circumstances. The 
removal of Robert Mugabe has provided the country an opportunity to 
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break from the past, and hopes have been raised for the birth of a new 
Zimbabwe. This chapter explores some of the measures that the adminis-
tration post-Mugabe should implement to set the country on a new path. 
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is not to argue for a particular political 
formation or political leaders to govern. Rather, its objective is to explore 
whether the idea of a new Zimbabwe is possible and what it would take to 
realise this objective. Before discussing the prospects for this desired state 
of affairs, it is important to examine the current situation, which is explored 
in the first part of the chapter. A brief overview of the fall of Mugabe and 
rise of Mnangagwa is then provided to show how a leader who com-
manded respect beyond the shores of our continent could exit in such an 
undignified manner. The core section is dedicated to a discussion of the 
prospects for a new Zimbabwe, and concluding remarks end the chapter.
the ZImbabwean ‘Problem’
The Zimbabwean problem is multifaceted, including economics, gover-
nance, politics and humanitarian issues (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 124). 
The problem is attributed to different sources, depending on where one is 
sitting or whose interests one serves. The colonial legacy, including the 
authoritarian colonial state and its institutions, as well as its policies, which 
significantly damaged the well-being of the black population, is often cited 
as one of the sources of this problem (Muzondidya 2009: 167–168). 
Raftopoulos (2009: 201) attributes the Zimbabwean problem partially to 
the political legacies of African nationalist politics. Imperialism, including 
the restrictive measures (perceived by some as sanctions) imposed on 
Zimbabwe by western countries, is often cited by the ruling party and its 
sympathisers as the major source of the problem (Government of 
Zimbabwe 2013: 8). On the other hand, another group, largely consti-
tuted by the opposition, some western countries, a section of civic society 
and some scholars, attributes the Zimbabwean crisis to the ruling elite in 
ZANU–PF. They often cite bad policies, corruption and economic mis-
management by ZANU–PF as some of the major causes. Putting this 
blame game aside, it is clear that the Zimbabwean problem is the outcome 
of a variety of factors. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 100) argues that the con-
tribution of the ruling elite to the problem should not be ignored. What 
was its contribution to the Zimbabwe problem and how did the prob-
lem evolve?
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Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980 after a protracted armed 
resistance against British colonial rule. A constitution negotiated at 
Lancaster House by the British government, Rhodesian minority govern-
ment and the liberation movements paved the way for independence 
(Marumahoko 2018: 16). While conserving white freedoms and benefits, 
the Constitution provided a foundation for constitutionalism in post- 
colonial Zimbabwe by, among other things, guaranteeing individual 
rights, the independence of the judiciary and multiparty democracy 
(Muzondidya 2009: 172). The first democratic elections of 1980, held 
under the regime of the Lancaster House Constitution, were won by the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party under the leadership of 
Robert Mugabe. Bourne (2011: 103) argues that ZANU was ‘structured 
as a Marxist party, with a politburo, and top-down organization reflecting 
the tenets of “democratic centralism”’. He further contends that ‘Mugabe 
was highly dependent on the military leaders’ of the Zimbabwe African 
National Liberation Army, the military wing of ZANU during the libera-
tion struggle. These leaders continued to play a critical role during 
Mugabe’s days in power, and they ultimately shaped his removal close to 
three decades later. The ZANU-led government adopted a development 
paradigm that centred on rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement. 
A number of pro-poor policies were adopted, which impacted positively 
on the delivery of public and social sectors such as education, health and 
sanitation (Muzondidya 2009: 168–169; Bourne 2011: 111). Boosted 
with political power and a strong economy, backed by productive agricul-
ture, mining and manufacturing, the government had the necessary instru-
ments to transform the lives of the majority of Zimbabweans who were at 
the receiving end of colonial policies. The period 1980–1990 is generally 
regarded as a decade of social progress.
While advancing welfare programmes, ZANU did not lose sight of the 
need to entrench its power amid the strong competition that was coming 
from the Joshua Nkomo-led Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) 
party. The Prime Minister’s Directives on Decentralisation of 1984 and 
1985, which provided for the establishment of various vertical state organ-
isation structures, were used by ZANU to consolidate its hold on political 
power. The roles of the party and state were fused through bodies that 
were formed according to these Directives (Muzondidya 2009: 178; 
Bourne 2011: 218). At around the same time, a confrontation with ZAPU 
took place in the Matabeleland provinces and some parts of Midlands, 
ZAPU’s strongholds. The military deployment to solve what Muzondidya 
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refers to as a ‘political problem’ in these provinces, dominated by Ndebele- 
speaking people, resulted in the loss of human life and property 
(Muzondidya 2009: 179, 185). Peace was restored when ZAPU merged 
with ZANU in 1987 to form ZANU–PF under an agreement called the 
Unity Accord. This effectively ended competitive politics, so the political 
hegemony of ZANU–PF was unchallenged. As a result, and according to 
some scholars, Zimbabwe became de facto a one party state, where oppo-
sition and criticism had no role (Bourne 2011: 120; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2003: 118). The appetite of some of the ruling elite not just for political 
power but also for private accumulation grew. Corruption cases of a grand 
nature that rocked the country, such as the Willowgate Scandal of 1988, 
attest to this. Constitutional amendments that were instituted towards the 
end of the first decade of independence ensured that the executive, in 
particular the President, could not be effectively checked by oversight 
institutions such as parliament.
In the second decade of independence, ‘many things began to go seri-
ously wrong’, overshadowing positive developments in the country 
(Bourne 2011: 126). The foundation for this situation had been set in the 
first decade. Corruption became widespread, poverty deepened, politics of 
patronage began to flourish, and labour strikes and food riots became the 
order of the day (Raftopoulos 2009: 203–204). The World Bank-backed 
Economic Structural Adjustments Programme (ESAP), which the govern-
ment adopted in the 1990s, failed to arrest the deteriorating economic 
and social situation (Muzondidya 2009: 188). Instead, owing to market 
liberalisation, privatisation and the reduction of government expenditure 
through the removal of government subsidies on food, health and educa-
tion, the socio-economic gains recorded in the first decade began to be 
eroded. People lost their jobs, prices rocketed, companies closed and cor-
ruption gained momentum. It was no wonder that ESAP was nicknamed 
‘Extreme Suffering for African People’ (Bourne 2011: 127). Ndlovu- 
Gatsheni (2003: 122) argues that the adoption of ESAP not only proved 
that the ZANU–PF government had abandoned the people but also that 
the political leadership, which had proclaimed itself socialist at indepen-
dence, had easily turned capitalist. Conversely, Bourne (2011: 127) claims 
that the regime’s attitude towards limiting the landscape for political par-
ticipation, especially from opposition parties and alternative sources of 
power, did not change. Legislative amendments, incentives and sanctions 
were some of the many strategies that were utilised towards this end 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 123). However, with the right political and 
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economic direction, this state of affairs could have been rescued as the 
economy had not reached the life support stage. The ingredients for a full- 
blown crisis were brewing as Zimbabwe approached the new millennium 
(Raftopoulos 2009: 201–203). Disagreeing with the direction that 
ZANU–PF was taking, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
was formed in 1999 from a conglomeration of labour, student and civic 
groups. The party, which mobilised on democratic principles, would later 
drive ZANU–PF to the limit, forcing the ruling party to embark on drastic 
measures to stay in power. The opposition was easily branded a creation of 
the west and an enemy of the state that needed to be extinguished by 
whatever means possible.
The third decade of independence is often described as the crisis decade, 
when the political and economic situation spilled out of control. Key ques-
tions around the role of the state, land and property rights, political and 
civil liberties, economic direction and the central role of the former 
President, Robert Mugabe, came to the forefront (Raftopoulos 2009: 
201). Raftopolous (2009: 202) contends that ZANU–PF ‘drew on a com-
bination of revived nationalism that privileged its role in the liberation of 
the country, prioritized the centrality of the fight for land, and demonized 
all those outside the selective “patriotic history” it espoused’. It adopted 
the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in early 2000, under which land 
in the hands of white farmers was taken without compensation and redis-
tributed to blacks as a way of addressing inequalities in land ownership. 
Britain and some other western countries responded by imposing restric-
tions on Zimbabwe, as they considered the programme to be an unlawful 
deprivation of property rights. ZANU–PF has argued since then that these 
are not restrictions but actually illegal economic sanctions that hurt ordi-
nary citizens the most (Government of Zimbabwe 2013: 8, 12). The 
question of whether these are restrictions or sanctions again depends on 
which side of the fence one is sitting on. What is not in dispute is that, 
after the programme was imposed in the early 2000s, the economy, which 
was already struggling, descended to crisis levels characterised by hyperin-
flation, low agricultural and industrial productivity, a ballooning informal 
sector and a gross domestic product that had shrunk by 50% as of 2008 
(Government of Zimbabwe 2013: 8).
Facing an international barrage of criticism regarding its human rights 
record, among other issues, Zimbabwe walked out of the Commonwealth 
in 2003. Relations with other international organisations and multilateral 
finance institutions soured, marking the beginning of Zimbabwe’s 
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international isolation. With the MDC posing a serious threat to ZANU–
PF’s political hegemony, especially after taking control of urban local gov-
ernment, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 104) contends that ‘regime security 
was often given priority at the expense of human security’. Bourne (2011: 
162) establishes that the ‘state could no longer provide many of its citizens 
with food, basic services, a guaranteed rule of law, and socio-economic as 
well as civil and political rights’. Gubbay (2016: 13) notes that the effec-
tiveness and independence of the judiciary, the bedrock of the rule of law 
and constitutionalism were compromised in many respects. The failure by 
the judiciary and parliament to effectively exercise their designated consti-
tutional role facilitated the abuse of executive power (Hatchard et  al. 
2004: 314). The Government of National Unity (GNU), established in 
2009 and constituted by ZANU–PF and the two MDC formations, fol-
lowing the disputed elections of 2008, rescued this situation.
The fourth decade of independence began when Zimbabwe was being 
governed by the GNU. The GNU managed to stabilise the political and 
economic situation as food, among other things, began to be more widely 
available in shops. The adoption of a multicurrency regime anchored on 
the United States (US) dollar contained inflation. Public service delivery 
in areas such as water, sanitation, health and education improved (Bourne 
2011: 226). The GNU also successfully steered the adoption of the first 
home-grown Constitution, which is pregnant with promise for a better 
life for ordinary citizens. The adoption of the new Constitution did not 
solve the Zimbabwean problem, however. Soon after the 2013 harmon-
ised elections, which were won by ZANU–PF and brought an end to the 
GNU’s tenure, the situation began to regress. The stagnant economy, 
which is perhaps the biggest challenge confronting the political leadership 
in Zimbabwe since the 2013 elections, shows that it takes more than elec-
toral votes, whether genuinely acquired or not, to fix bread and butter 
issues. The developments after the removal of Robert Mugabe from office 
in November 2017, to be discussed in the next section, support this thesis.
the Fall oF mugabe and the rIse oF mnangagwa
On 21 November 2017, President Robert Mugabe handed in his resigna-
tion letter to Jacob Mudenda, the Speaker of the National Assembly. 
Earlier on, the military had taken over the country and confined the 
President to his residence, claiming that it had been forced to intervene in 
civilian affairs in order ‘to pacify a degenerating political, social and 
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economic situation in [Zimbabwe] which if not addressed may result in 
violent conflict’ (Jordan 2017: 1). Its publicly stated objective was to 
‘address the human security threats in the country’ (Jordan 2017: 1; 
Jongwe 2018: 1).
The events that culminated in Mugabe’s resignation were welcome for 
some while for others they were unacceptable and frightening in a consti-
tutional democracy. Whichever side one is on, the question that begs an 
answer is whether the events fall into the narrative of a national democratic 
project or a military takeover. Some say the events had no bearing as the 
president voluntarily gave notice of his resignation in terms of section 96 
(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Huffingtonpost 2017: 1; VOA 
2017: 1). In democracies, leaders leave office when they have lost the sup-
port of the people. The president’s departure from office was endorsed by 
the leaders of the opposition, ordinary citizens and the international com-
munity. However, the status of the departure was cast wide open when 
Mugabe later made an about-turn and insinuated that a military coup, and 
not voluntary resignation, was the reason he vacated office so suddenly. 
This has prompted some to reexamine the circumstances.
It seems there are merits to Mugabe’s claim that he left office owing to 
a military coup. His ousting had some of the characteristics of coups seen 
across the world, although it was celebrated by citizens and was not criti-
cised by the international community. First, the army moved tanks and 
other military vehicles and gun-wielding soldiers to strategic places around 
the country, which is often the case when mounting a military coup. The 
parliament building was barricaded, the police disarmed and the president 
confined to his residence. Secondly, the military placed some of Mugabe’s 
ministers and strong supporters under house arrest. Thirdly, a senior mili-
tary official broadcast live on radio and television, reassuring citizens that 
the military had not seized political power but were taking measures to 
restore normality in accordance with the Constitution.
The Constitution of Zimbabwe vests the power to deploy the military 
in the President and not the army commanders, as happened during the 
measures that culminated with Mugabe’s ousting. In addition, there are 
special circumstances under which the army can be moved from the bar-
racks. One of these circumstances relates to disasters. In this case, how-
ever, there was no disaster to attend to, nor was there a humanitarian 
crisis. The country was not at war with a foreign power and parliament had 
not approved the deployment of the army.
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A related question is why the events were happening 37  years after 
independence, and where they were taking the country. It has been sug-
gested that one of the reasons that explains Mugabe’s unceremonious 
departure from office is that he had lost the support of the army and the 
influential war veterans that had propped up his rule for close to four 
decades (Kwaramba 2017: 1; Rupiya 2012: 13). Another reason is perhaps 
that Mugabe had incensed the army and the war veterans by procrastinat-
ing about the question of who would succeed him in the party and gov-
ernment. This saw the emergence of two factions in ZANU–PF, the 
so-called G40 and Lacoste factions, each vying to take over (Chirimambowa 
2016: 1).
The situation was compounded by the emergence of Grace Mugabe, 
the first lady, as a formidable voice in the ruling party, close or working 
with the G40 factions. She appeared to have sidelined the war veterans and 
the commanders of the army, who were historically considered the van-
guard of the ruling party (Chirimambowa 2016: 2; Kwaramba 2017: 1). 
Mugabe helped to seal his own fate by appearing to suggest that he would 
prefer his wife to take over from him. This brought him into conflict with 
the army and the war veterans who preferred Emmerson Mnangagwa, one 
of Mugabe’s vice- presidents. In the end, Mugabe lost the battle to shape 
the succession debate.
There are a few lessons that can be drawn from this. One of them is 
about the danger of concentrating too much power in one person at the 
expense of institutions. Another is that sitting presidents need to avoid 
overstaying their welcome. Yet another is that leadership should always 
change hands. It should be acknowledged, however, that not everything 
about Mugabe was bad. The strong education system that Zimbabwe is 
often acclaimed for is largely attributed to ZANU–PF policies and Mugabe 
in particular. The idea of land reform, which many criticise Mugabe for, 
was not bad in itself, but it could have been handled better. Finally, 
Mugabe cannot be blamed for everything that has gone wrong in 
Zimbabwe. All Zimbabweans, particularly those who were governing with 
him, must take equal blame and acknowledge their mistakes and wrong-
doing. Even ordinary citizens must take a portion of the blame: it is often 
said that the people deserve the government they every nation has the 
government it deserves. History the world over has proved that people 
power can remove governments that no longer serve their interests. Even 
so, the removal of Mugabe may have been necessary, but did it mark the 
beginning of a new era for Zimbabwe?
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With Mugabe gone, his former vice-president and close collaborator, 
Emmerson Mnangagwa, took the reins of power in both the government 
and the ruling party in November 2017. He announced himself on the 
political scene as a reformist who was prepared to redefine the political and 
economic trajectory of the country. He nonetheless appointed a cabinet 
that primarily constituted ministers from the previous government to take 
charge until the July 2018 harmonised elections, raising early questions 
about his intentions to change. He declared that ‘Zimbabwe is Open for 
Business’ and initiated the process of international reengagement. 
President Mnangagwa introduced a raft of measures, which included anti- 
corruption initiatives, to ensure effective, clean and accountable govern-
ment. The political environment improved, to the extent that opposition 
political parties largely freely mobilised. Even though the electoral envi-
ronment improved in general, the question remains whether this improve-
ment was enough to guarantee an undisputed election outcome. The 
outcome of the July 2018 harmonised elections, in which Mnangagwa was 
reelected, was disputed by the MDC, giving rise to a legitimacy deficit.
In his inauguration speech, Mnangagwa declared the ‘dawn of the 
“Second Republic”’ in Zimbabwe. The stated strategic vision of 
Mnangagwa’s government was for Zimbabwe to become a middle-income 
country by 2030. He initially appointed a refreshed cabinet and retired a 
number of senior bureaucrats who had been in government for decades. 
The government announced a number of reforms to address the economic 
challenges. However, ever since his reelection on 30 July 2018, the econ-
omy is threatening to descend to the 2008 crisis levels with clear indica-
tions that the market lacks confidence and trust in the new government. 
Prices are rocketing, fuel is in short supply and companies are struggling to 
access foreign currency to enable production. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 
128) argues that the economy will not ‘be solved by populist rhetoric, 
devoid of pragmatism’. The question, therefore, is what it would take to fix 
the Zimbabwean problem. The question is dealt with in the next section.
FIxIng the ZImbabwean Problem
Zimbabwe is endowed with a rich natural and human resource base that 
gives it an advantage over its regional and international counterparts (see 
Government of Zimbabwe 2013: 16). Bad governance that has given rise 
to political, economic and humanitarian problems requires urgent fixing, 
however (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 100). According to Smith (2007: 6), 
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there are four sets of attributes that require reform if good governance is 
to be brought about: constitutional, political, administrative and public 
policy. He argues that at ‘the constitutional level good governance requires 
changes that will strengthen the accountability of political leaders to the 
people, ensure respect for human rights, strengthen the rule of law, and 
decentralize political authority’. When it comes to political action and 
organisation, Smith states that ‘three attributes of good governance are 
common to the governance agendas of most aid agencies; political plural-
ism, opportunities for extensive participation in politics, and probity and 
incorruptibility in the use of public powers and offices by servants of the 
state’. Turning to administration, he argues that ‘good governance 
requires accountable and transparent public administration; effective pub-
lic management, including a capacity to design good policies as well as to 
implement them’. In this section, we discuss six interventions that cut 
across these attributes and have the potential to make a positive impact on 
Zimbabwe.
Building Trust and Confidence
Public trust and confidence are key indicators of a functional government 
and good governance (Chanley et al. 2000: 239). When people have con-
fidence in government institutions, they are more likely to support gov-
ernment policies, comply with the laws and pay taxes, among other 
responsibilities. In Zimbabwe, public trust and confidence in government 
institutions has been on a downward spiral in both the Mugabe and 
Mnangagwa era. The decline appears to be linked to people’s disappoint-
ment in government, its inefficiency, ineffectiveness, inability to fight cor-
ruption, disputed elections, negative perceptions of the economy and an 
increase in their knowledge of how the government works, among other 
issues. In the ensuing paragraphs, we recommend reforms in democratic 
and administrative processes as some of the ways in which public trust and 
confidence can be restored.
 Democratic Processes
Good governance denotes in part that governance processes, procedures 
and structures are democratic (Smith 2007: 4). The departure of Mugabe 
presents a real opportunity for the country to redeem public trust and 
confidence. One of the ways in which this can be achieved is by opening 
up political processes. This entails breaking from a past in which 
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opposition politics was criminalised and frowned upon, and when those 
who led opposition endured harassment and intimidation, thereby closing 
the space for the democratic exchange of ideas. According to Osaghae 
(1999: 9), one of the crucial elements for assessing democratisation is the 
existence of pluralism and multipartyism. This relates to the existence of 
an environment that encourages competitive politics in which the opposi-
tion parties have a fair chance of coming to power. Although the political 
environment improved after the fall of Mugabe, the motivation for liber-
alisation is inadequate, in the sense that it appeared to have been pressured 
by external actors rather than being driven by a shared genuine desire for 
reform. Although external pressures are crucial for the establishment of 
democracy in countries previously under authoritarian rule, such pressures 
are motivated more by the need for such countries to entrench their inter-
ests  (Smith 2007: 272). Thus, the desire to reform should be locally 
shared and driven, with international actors merely taking a supporting 
role. Reforms should, for instance, target institutions that administer elec-
tions or play a facilitative role in that regard, given that Zimbabwe has a 
long history of contested electoral processes and outcomes (Kambale 
(2012: 1; Rupiya 2012: 9; Southall and Slabbert 2018: 1). Public media 
reforms are also important in the context of enhancing democratisation 
and increasing public trust and confidence in government (African 
Network of Constitutional Lawyers 2012: 4). Finally, it has been observed 
that the reform of the Public Order and Security Act will go a long way 
towards fostering a healthy political environment, as the legislation tram-
ples upon fundamental freedoms relating to association and assembly, 
among others, that are entrenched in the Constitution (Human Rights 
Watch 2013: 2). Politically, the legislation is out of sync with the pledge 
by Mnangagwa to do things differently.
 Administrative Processes
Good governance is not only about democratic governance processes but 
also about efficient and effective administrative systems (Smith 2007: 4). 
Such systems were largely absent at all levels of government during the 
latter half of Mugabe’s rule. Thus, it is crucial that the new government, 
post-Mugabe, should undertake extensive administrative reforms to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness. At the heart of the reforms is  the 
need to refine the way in which government agencies work. This can be 
achieved by, among other things, professionalising human resource man-
agement, changing organisational structures and reviewing governance 
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procedures. It is important that government agencies attract and retain 
public servants with the right skills, qualifications and dedication if service 
delivery is to improve. Professionalisation should be at the centre of the 
new recruitment and selection policy. Recruitment and selection should 
be preceded by rigorous job analysis (Ashraf 2017: 1). There is a need for 
the new administration to set up good succession planning in public ser-
vice. Jarvalt (2007: 8) notes that viable succession planning needs to be 
accompanied by a training policy that motivates employees, heightens 
their organisational awareness, offers promotion opportunities, promotes 
common civil service culture and increases the skill base. The question of 
reducing the number of government employees will also need to be 
addressed, given that the civil service is bloated—to the extent that around 
90% of the revenue collected by government goes towards meeting its sal-
ary obligations. The size of the civil service could be reduced by, among 
other strategies, eliminating ghost workers, verifying that civil servants on 
the payroll are actually working, laying off contract workers, voluntary 
retrenchments, early retirement, recruitment freezes and the closing of 
government agencies whose functions can be efficiently performed by the 
private sector (Lienert 1998: 6). To its credit, the Mnangagwa administra-
tion has already laid off a few senior government officials. These retrench-
ments, however, need to be based on performance evaluations and other 
verifiable considerations. Currently, it is hard to tell what the criteria for 
the retrenchments are, leading critics to speculate that they are targeting 
bureaucrats who are perceived to be sympathetic to Mugabe. The remu-
neration of government employees ought to be addressed as part of the 
administrative reforms. This entails reviewing the current remuneration 
policy, enhancing transparency and improving the ability of government 
to recruit and retain individuals with skills that are in short supply. A good 
remuneration policy needs to be guided by fiscal realities, competences, 
meritocracy, the penalisation of poor performers, the scarcity of certain 
skills and experience, and the elimination of salary gaps for comparable 
jobs; among other considerations (Lienert (1998: 7). It is also important 
that the efficiencies of government agencies are reviewed as part of the 
administrative reforms that are meant to improve service delivery.
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Getting the Most Out of Limited Public Resources
 Corruption
In Zimbabwe, corruption is prevalent across all sectors, manifesting itself 
mainly through bribery, extortion, nepotism, patronage and grand venal-
ity, among other forms of abuse of power. The  Corruption Index for 
2018 ranked Zimbabwe 157 out of 176 countries which were surveyed. It 
is estimated that Zimbabwe is losing US$1 billion annually to corruption 
to the detriment of economic and social development (Takawira 2017: 
204). Corruption is harmful as it often increases the cost of doing busi-
ness, dissuades foreign direct investment, distorts the financial and eco-
nomic environment, undermines human capital development, creates 
inequalities in opportunities available to citizens and business actors, leads 
to inefficiencies in public service delivery and often results in poor alloca-
tion of resources, among other negatives (Mugova 2017: 1; Wafawarova 
2015: 1). Thus, the fight against corruption is perhaps the biggest chal-
lenge confronting the post-Mugabe administration. The Zimbabwe Anti-
Corruption Commission (ZACC) faces a plethora of challenges that 
undermine its ability to fight corruption effectively. The challenges include 
political meddling, a lack of operational independence, the politicisation 
of corruption cases, a shortage of skilled staff and lack of sufficient 
resources. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), which prosecutes 
corrupt suspects, is grappling with similar challenges. In the first quarter 
of 2018, the Prosecutor-General issued a statement bemoaning the lack of 
political will, human capacity and financial support as the reasons most 
corruption cases were not being prosecuted (Hodzi 2018: 1). In response 
to the inability of the ZACC and NPA to contain corruption, President 
Mnangagwa established a special anti-corruption unit in his office respon-
sible for investigating and prosecuting corruption cases. It remains to be 
seen whether this unit will bring dividends in the war against corruption.
Corruption in Zimbabwe is now so entrenched that only genuine anti- 
corruption efforts anchored on key strategies have better prospects of con-
taining it. A multi-actor and sectoral approach, whereby financial 
institutions, audit firms, anti-corruption agencies and tax authorities work 
in collaboration to prevent, detect, investigate and respond to corruption, 
is necessary. Without close collaboration and coordination between the 
agencies responsible for the identification, investigation and prosecution 
of corruption cases, the war against corruption is unlikely to be won any 
time soon. The recovery of proceeds of crime is an important aspect of 
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anti-corruption initiatives throughout the world. There is, therefore, a 
need for Zimbabwe to set up or strengthen a specialist asset recovery 
agency responsible for tracing the proceeds of corruption, securing freez-
ing orders, and confiscating and forfeiting assets. The courts play an 
important role of ensuring that those that steal from the poor are jailed. 
Currently, the judiciary faces a number of challenges that constrains its 
ability to deliver justice, such as lack of sufficient resources and corruption 
within its judicial ranks. Stiffer penalties for offenders can be an effective 
deterrent of corrupt behaviour. The existing penalties provided in law are 
not harsh enough to realise this objective. It has also not been uncommon 
for high-profile corrupt suspects or individuals to receive preferential 
treatment during investigation, prosecution and sentencing. There have 
been a number of arrests and prosecution of senior bureaucrats, politicians 
and other influential people in the post-Mugabe era, but the rate of arrests 
and prosecution does not mirror the deep state of corruption. The fact 
that there have been no significant successful prosecutions and that arrests 
and investigations are widely perceived to be selective continues to raise 
questions about the genuineness of anti-corruption efforts under the 
‘Second Republic’ (Mahere 2019: 1).
 Resource Wastage
The wastage of public resources is one of the challenges that the new 
administration needs to overcome. While an appetite for wasting resources 
is common throughout public services, including in state-owned enter-
prises and local government, it can be easily identified at high levels of 
government. President Mnangagwa has followed in the footsteps of 
Mugabe, whose cabinet was often criticised for being disproportionate to 
the size of the country and the state of the economy. On 8 November 
2019, Mnangagwa announced the appointment of six new ministers and 
five new deputy ministers. At 25 ministers, 18 deputy ministers and 10 
provincial ministers, the cabinet is now bigger than the one he inherited. 
He has also created an additional ministry (that of National Housing and 
Social Amenities). All ministries have permanent secretaries, principal 
directors, departmental directors and other senior staff, whose employ-
ment comes with hefty remuneration packages. Given that some of the 
ministries have identical responsibilities and functions, the duplication of 
roles and resource wastage is ubiquitous. The creation of non-essential top 
government positions, excess ministries and expendable departments is 
associated with a spike in travel and subsistence allowances, 
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supererogatory travelling, unnecessary events and unimportant interna-
tional travelling (Langa 2015: 1; Magaisa 2018a: 4). This resource wast-
age, which a struggling economy cannot bear, could be contained by 
making cabinet leaner, and abolishing unnecessary senior positions, min-
istries and departments. In addition, it would help to do away with unnec-
essary travel, reduce the number of delegates when travelling locally and 
abroad, and consume locally produced goods and services. It is also 
important that through its oversight function, parliament should hold the 
executive accountable for resource wastage, among other forms of unsound 
or uneconomic usage of resources.
 Public Procurement Process
The public procurement process is one of the most critical governance 
process, in which development plans are translated into action in mone-
tary terms. The importance of this process for national development in 
Zimbabwe is recognised in the 2013 Constitution, which requires that 
public funds be spent transparently, prudently, economically and effec-
tively. Besides these general principles of public finance, the Constitution 
(section 315) requires the public procurement process to ensure that it is 
transparent, fair, honest, cost-effective and competitive. It singles out joint 
ventures, contracts for the construction and operation of infrastructure 
and facilities, and concessions for mineral and other rights as state con-
tracts whose negotiation and performance requires strict regulation (see 
section 315(2) of the Constitution). This constitutional framework is 
there to ensure that Zimbabwe gets the most out of its public procure-
ment processes. During the Lancaster House constitutional order, it was 
recognised that Zimbabwe did not always get the most out of its public 
procurement processes. More than six years into the new constitutional 
regime, the situation has not changed at all levels of government, and 
procurement is often being used to benefit a few key players, usually along 
political, social and economic lines (Chigudu 2014: 21). The practice of 
contractors being paid for goods and services they have not delivered 
remains common. In other cases, some contractors provide substandard 
work and get paid for it, while others inflate prices above the market rates, 
usually in connivance with government officials. There is evidence of some 
contractors who have been given government contracts despite lacking 
the requisite capacity to deliver them. Thus, value for money has not been 
achieved in a significant number of contracts which have been awarded, 
and the overall implication is that a significant quantity of public funds 
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continues to be lost through the public procurement process (Chigudu 
2014: 23). Building a new Zimbabwe requires that there should be a 
change in how the public procurement process is utilised. If it is used for 
the public good, it has the potential to drive economic growth and social 
development.
A Culture of Constitutionalism
A new Zimbabwe needs a culture of constitutionalism, which is the cen-
trepiece of any constitutional democracy, to develop. Constitutionalism 
requires the limitation of state power through a constitution or other 
mechanisms, to protect the citizens against arbitrary rule (Okoth-Ogendo 
1993: 66). The key ingredients of constitutionalism are supremacy of the 
constitution, a Bill of Rights, separation of powers, democratic and 
accountable governance, independence of the judiciary and the rule of 
law. All these key principles of constitutionalism are captured in the 2013 
Constitution of Zimbabwe. Thus, the foundation upon which a culture of 
constitutionalism can be built upon is already there. What is required is 
the creation of a conducive environment for this culture to thrive. While 
the full implementation of the Constitution is perhaps the starting point 
for the culture to develop, a change in political culture is essential given 
that the politics of independent Zimbabwe has been toxic.
 Rule of Law
The starting point for setting Zimbabwe back on the right path is respect 
for the rule of law (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 129). This is important as the 
rule of law is the bedrock of any democratic society, which includes differ-
ent dimensions of justice. The rule of law is a complex principle that 
requires the strict observance of constitutional and legislative rules, which 
can only flourish in an environment where the independence of the judi-
ciary is protected and promoted. Gubbay (2016: 1) states that if a certain 
piece of legislation is required to give effect to a constitutional principle, 
goal or vision, such legislation should be enacted expeditiously, because 
without it that principle, goal or vision will not be realised. Once the rel-
evant pieces of legislation are in place, he states that a climate of legality 
becomes important because without it laws are meaningless (Gubbay 
2016: 1). The rule of law also requires an impartial and independent judi-
ciary to oversee a legal framework that is known, clearly formulated, sta-
ble, predictable and applied uniformly. These principles provide a ‘basis for 
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“legitimate expectations” on the part of the citizens. The rule of law, thus, 
guarantee that citizens know what obligations are imposed by the law, and 
can expect these obligations to remain unchanged until the law is changed’, 
but not in a retroactive manner (Smith 2007: 78). On the economic side, 
it is highly unlikely that an investor, especially an international one, will 
invest in a country where the legal framework is not predictable and 
respected, where the judiciary fails to implement the legislative framework 
fairly and where court decisions are not respected. Black markets, tax eva-
sion and financial irregularities, which are common in Zimbabwe, are all 
symptoms of a market that lacks trust and confidence in the existing for-
mal legal governance architecture. Thus, the rule of the law is not only 
important to protect and promote political rights but also economic 
development. In countries in transition such as Zimbabwe, the rule of the 
law is particularly crucial to ‘help establish a clear break with the past, and 
new political culture in which all participants respects the law’ (Smith 
2007: 81).
 Respect for State Institutions
Respect for state institutions is a fundamental feature in a constitutional 
democracy. Evidence in independent Zimbabwe, where the executive neu-
tralised other arms of government, demonstrates that imbalance of power 
among the different arms of government is bad for democracy. The execu-
tive easily conducted its activities as it pleased with little or no oversight 
from other arms of government (Veritas 2016: 2). This unequal balance is 
one of the sources of many problems experienced after the first decade of 
independence. Modern constitutions are increasingly making provisions 
for independent constitutional commissions to strengthen democracy by, 
for example, complementing the role of the traditional arms of govern-
ment. The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, for instance, shares govern-
mental power not just among the three arms of government (executive, 
parliament and judiciary), but also makes provision for the establishment 
of several independent commissions supporting democracy. The commis-
sions include the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, Zimbabwe 
Gender Commission and the National Peace and Reconciliation 
Commission. The Constitution also makes provision for the Office of the 
Auditor General, ZACC and the NPA.  It becomes important for these 
arms of government and constitutional bodies to respect each other’s 
functional terrain while cooperating with one another to avoid repeating 
the mistakes of yesteryear. The decision of President Mnangagwa to 
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establish a prosecutorial unit in his office has raised questions about 
whether the executive is not encroaching on the terrain of the NPA to the 
detriment of oversight. The same argument can be used in relation to the 
continued use of the President’s power under the Presidential (Temporary 
Measures) Act to make law, an area reserved for parliament. Thus, respect 
for state institutions is necessary for a new Zimbabwe, otherwise it remains 
the old one.
 Redefining the Relationship Between the State and Its Citizens
A new Zimbabwe is possible, but not without redefining the relationship 
between the state and its citizens. The state has obligations to its citizens 
inasmuch as the citizens have a role to play in a democratic society. The 
state is there to serve. It, therefore, follows that the delivery of public and 
social services to the people by the state is not a favour but an obligation. 
The relationship between the state, on one hand, and citizens, on the 
other hand, should be seen from the perspective of the fundamental 
human rights that are inalienable to every human being. Human rights 
‘are claims to entitlements that are held to be morally defensible regardless 
of the law in any particular sovereign state. Rights claim that others should 
act in a particular way, or refrain from acting in ways which restrict the 
enjoyment of what is claimed’ (Smith 2007: 45). The respect, protection 
and promotion of human rights is a fundamental virtue of any democratic 
society (Smith 2007: 4). The state has a role to mediate relations between 
citizens to ensure that both individual and group rights are respected. 
Access to water, housing and sanitation are important socio-economic 
rights that should be protected and promoted by all tiers of government 
and their agencies as well as by constitutional bodies. The cholera out-
break of September 2018, which affected many and resulted in several 
deaths, shows that the government, at all levels, is failing to fulfil these 
rights. Yet the Constitution obliges the government to promote and pro-
tect these rights and to ensure that they are realised in practice. Thus, 
unless there are radical improvements in how the state delivers key public 
and social services, it will be a long time before a real new Zimbabwe can 
be realised.
Economic Reforms
Zimbabwe is in the grip of an economic crisis that has persisted for close 
to three decades. The crisis, which can be traced back to the Mugabe era, 
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manifests among other aspects in high unemployment rate, liquidity chal-
lenges, a dwindling formal sector, corruption, heavy local and foreign 
debt, shortage of foreign currency and a lack of foreign direct investment. 
These problems have persisted in the ‘Second Republic’ under the 
Mnangagwa administration, dampening the euphoria and enthusiasm that 
accompanied Mugabe’s ousting (Moulds 2017: 1). Economic reforms are 
necessary if the new administration wants to restore the country to its 
former glory as a regional economic powerhouse. Mnangagwa’s 
Transitional Stabilisation Programme, an economic blueprint, carries a 
number of austerity measures to arrest some of the economic challenges. 
For instance, it provides measures to reduce the fiscal deficit, address debt 
challenges, and curb corruption and other rent-seeking behaviours 
(Government of Zimbabwe 2018: 11, 17, 18, 21). The economic reforms 
are yet to make a meaningful impact, partially because they lack effective 
implementation. The biggest culprit is the government, which continues 
to disrespect its own laws, policies and programmes. For instance, unbud-
geted, unauthorised spending and overspending are still common 
(Mhlanga 2019: 1). The executive continues to spend resources outside 
the parameters approved by parliament. Such ill-disciplined fiscal behav-
iour has caused economic problems, such as hyperinflation, which have hit 
the poor the hardest in a country where unemployment is high and 
xtreme poverty is endemic. The absence of meaningful social safety nets 
exacerbates the plight of the poor. A number of factors need to be consid-
ered if economic reforms are to succeed, such as securing buy-in from 
ordinary citizens, opposition political formations, the business sector and 
the major international actors, including banks and other financial institu-
tions. Furthermore, the government needs to address the contradictions 
in the ideologies underlying economic reforms. For example, although the 
country has pledged to liberalise the economy, key resource allocation 
systems remain centrally controlled, particularly by the executive. This 
could explain why efforts towards reforming the economy have thus far 
failed to deliver the desired dividends.
 Currency Reforms
Zimbabwe has been operating a multicurrency regime, with the dominant 
currency being the US dollar since 2009. In 2016, the government intro-
duced bond notes, a surrogate currency, with the stated objectives of 
incentivising exports, addressing cash shortages and preventing export of 
the US dollar at the expense of the local economy. The bond notes, which 
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were said to be backed by hard currency under the Afreximbank facility, 
were pegged at 1:1 with the greenback. In short, the bond notes were said 
to be redeemable in exchange for US dollars. Initially, this arrangement 
worked until the government started to introduce more bond notes to the 
market to fund its expenditure (Magaisa 2018a: 3). Eventually, the bond 
notes lost value against the US dollar, resulting in the latter disappearing 
from formal channels and trading on the parallel market at high rates. In 
October 2018, the government introduced new monetary and tax regime 
measures, which included the provision of the opening of foreign currency 
accounts. These operated in parallel with the Real Transfer Gross System 
(RTGS)/bond notes accounts. On 24 June 2019, the government 
announced that foreign currency was no longer legal tender in Zimbabwe, 
making the RTGS dollar/bond notes the only acceptable medium of 
exchange for local transactions. On 7 November 2019, government 
announced that it was replacing the RTGS dollar with the Zimbabwe dol-
lar. Although the country has tried to address the problem of shortage of 
foreign currency by banning local purchasers from using hard currency, 
the problem persists. Most local businesses and service providers have con-
tinued indexing prices to the US dollar. The situation is made worse by a 
lack of consistency in the application of the policy. For instance, the gov-
ernment has allowed mining companies and non-governmental organisa-
tions to continue doing business, including the payment of salaries, in US 
dollars. The government is also undermining its own policy. At ports of 
entry, the government policy that customs duty for car imports is made in 
US dollars and not the local currency has been retained. The adoption of 
about five currency regimes in less than three years shows that there is 
confusion and a lack of know-how. Unfortunately, the Zimbabwe dollar 
continues to lose value daily, impacting negatively on its buying power. 
The potential solution to the currency crisis that is unfolding lies in a full 
return to the multicurrency regime in which the Zimbabwe dollar has no 
role. This is required until the economic fundamentals are in place for the 
country to adopt its own currency. These include an increase in exports 
and therefore an improved ability to generate enough foreign currency to 
cover the country’s major needs.
 Disposal of Non-Performing State-Owned Enterprises
Zimbabwe has many state-owned enterprises (SOEs), established to 
advance government policy in areas such as the provision of public infra-
structure and services such as water, energy, telecommunications, 
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transportation, health and education, to mention just a few. Almost all 
SOEs have not performed well ever since the economic situation took a 
downturn. In 2016, for example, the Auditor General reported that 15 
SOEs faced collapse as they were in untenable financial positions (2016: 
2). The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority and its subsidiaries, 
National Railways of Zimbabwe, Grain Marketing Board and TelOne 
were some of those that were reported to be on the brink of collapse 
owing to a deplorable financial situation (Majaka 2017: 1; Auditor-General 
2016: 2). In the post-Mugabe era, the government needs to put in place 
policies that promote good corporate governance in these organisations. 
A critical part of realising this objective is ensuring that skills, competency 
and experience constitute the main basis upon which people are appointed 
to senior positions in these SOEs rather than patronage, as has been the 
preferred practice. Given this background, the new administration should 
also consider privatising some of the SOEs (Majaka 2017: 1).
 Investment
There is no doubt that real economic development will not be realised in 
Zimbabwe unless there is tangible foreign direct investment. If the coun-
try is to attract investment, it is crucial that it reviews its investment policy, 
which under Mugabe was primarily anchored on the Look East policy. 
Adopted by Mugabe after western governments imposed restrictions on 
Zimbabwe, the policy seeks to expand bilateral and trade relations and 
offer priority to investors from the Far East countries. Chinyama (2015: 1) 
argues that the Look East policy often benefited China more than 
Zimbabwe, given that China has access to Zimbabwe’s abundant natural 
resources at low cost. He further argues that most of the investments 
China made in Zimbabwe have not generated meaningful employment 
opportunities, as Chinese companies bring their own workers (Chinyama 
2015: 1). Other concerns are that local employees are paid wages that are 
below those stipulated by the government and that Chinese companies do 
not often place premium on environmental impact assessment (Chinyama 
2015: 1). As a result, many of the development projects established by the 
Chinese were undertaken at the expense of environmental preservation. 
Since Mugabe, President Mnangagwa has tried to reach out to western 
countries for investment. In this regard, he has sent ministerial delegations 
to engage with their governments and to participate in platforms for 
investment, such as the World Economic Forum. In addition, the 
Mnangagwa government has amended the Indigenisation and Economic 
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Empowerment Act and adopted the motto ‘Zimbabwe is Open for 
Business’ in a bid to attract investment. Real investment has not been 
forthcoming despite all these spirited efforts, because the rhetoric has not 
translated into real action. Zimbabwe’s human rights and rule of law 
records seem to be the major stumbling block. The disputed election of 
Mnangagwa has come with legitimacy deficiencies. Magaisa (2018b: 4) 
argues that Mnangagwa’s administration needs to fix this deficit through 
engaging the opposition, particularly Nelson Chamisa’s MDC, and under-
taking serious political reforms. Without this, it is highly unlikely that 
investors will invest in Zimbabwe in the near future. While foreign invest-
ment is necessary, it is also important that the new administration improves 
the environment for local investment, as charity begins at home. For 
example, the new administration can promote local investment by reduc-
ing taxes, eliminating red tape in the approval of investment projects, 
reviewing the procedures for doing business and providing various 
incentives.
 The Stimulation of Local Production and the Role of the Reserve Bank
Zimbabwe has been struggling to manage its imports bill, with imports 
significantly greater than exports. The implication is that more foreign 
currency goes, adversely affecting the balance of payments. To make mat-
ters worse, the majority of the imports are on consumption and not pro-
duction goods and services. This means that the foreign currency is being 
spent on goods that do not generate additional foreign currency. As a 
result, the country the country is struggling to mobilise enough foreign 
currency to meet its needs. In the absence of sufficient foreign currency, 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has been allocating foreign cur-
rency to different sectors depending on priority considerations. The chal-
lenge is that some of the key sectors have not always been able to access 
the foreign currency they need to enable the production of goods and 
services. The result is often that there are shortages of certain goods and 
services which has a knock-on effect on price increases. The role of the 
RBZ in the allocation of foreign currency is also inefficient and provides 
room for rent-seeking. It is a mere attempt to address the symptom of the 
problem rather than being the long-term solution to foreign currency 
shortages—which lies with increasing local production and increasing 
exports (Magaisa 2018a: 3). Local production can be stimulated in various 
ways, including the provision of incentives to local industries. Until 
Zimbabwe begins to rely on its local industries, particularly for 
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consumption goods, the balance of payments and therefore foreign cur-
rency shortages will remain a big problem. The role of the RBZ in quasi- 
fiscal activities is also problematic, and takes it away from its core function 
of setting monetary policy. Each time the bank is involved in quasi-fiscal 
activities, from the days of Mugabe when the RBZ Governor was Gideon 
Gono, the result has often been that the inflation rate increases and debt 
balloons, among other challenges. Unfortunately, those in power have 
turned a blind eye to this lesson from the past.
Vertical Power-Sharing
Like most post-colonial African governments, the ZANU–PF-led govern-
ment inherited a system of government that concentrated governmental 
powers and resources at the centre. This centralisation of governmental 
powers continued as Zimbabwe walked into independence, giving rise to 
an over-centralised system of government. Hatchard et al. (2004: 20) con-
tend that this system gave ‘little or no space for alternative challenges, 
questions or control’ at both vertical and horizontal levels. The respon-
siveness and accountability of the government were, therefore, compro-
mised. The problems that Zimbabwe has experienced since 2000 can 
partially be attributed to the nature of this system. Building a new 
Zimbabwe will require the dismantling of this system and its replacement 
by a form of government in which governmental powers are shared at 
multiple levels. According to Manor (2013: 32), if this multilevel system 
of government is to work well, key ingredients must be in place. First, 
substantial powers must be devolved to democratic subnational units. 
Secondly, substantial resources must be devolved to subnational level. 
Thirdly, mechanisms that promote the horizontal accountability of 
bureaucrats to elected representatives as well as the downward account-
ability of elected representatives to the citizens are required. If these ingre-
dients are in place, such a system of government has the potential to 
deliver development, democracy and peace (Chigwata 2018: 4–6).
 The Democratic Benefit
Vertical power-sharing can deepen democracy in many ways. The organ-
isation of government at multilevel levels creates multiple opportunities 
for political participation whether directly or through representatives 
(Smith 2007: 156). Citizens are likely to participate more when govern-
ment is physically closer to them. Civil society activities are often 
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stimulated when governmental powers and resources are injected into 
subnational and local arenas in order to influence decisions over the use of 
such resources (Manor 2013: 33). Smaller political parties and indepen-
dent candidates, who often  face difficulties in competing for political 
power at the national level, have a higher chance of succeeding at subna-
tional and local level when the political costs of mobilisation tend to be 
low (Chigwata 2018: 5). The overall effect of this is that the democratic 
pluralism that lubricates a democratic society is promoted. Citizens are 
also more likely to hold public officials accountable at subnational or local 
level owing to the closer proximity of government. A multilevel system of 
government reduces the concentration of power at central level and the 
powers given to subnational governments can be effective in checking 
central government and preventing the arbitrary exercise of power 
(Hatchard et al. 2004: 187). This vertical separation of powers can go a 
long way towards complementing the horizontal separation of powers, 
involving the role of the judiciary, parliament and independent constitu-
tional commissions (Chigwata 2018: 4–5). Thus, vertical power-sharing 
has the potential to enhance participatory, responsive and accountable 
governance in Zimbabwe.
 The Development Benefit
Alongside its democratic benefits, vertical power-sharing also has the 
potential to engender development as public resources and power are dif-
fused closer to the people. This enables the easier provision of public 
goods and services in line with local needs and preferences. The result is 
often that the government’s responsiveness is improved (Manor 2013: 
33). With decentralised governmental powers and resources, citizens in 
different parts of the country can define and lead their own developments. 
Some provinces are endowed with a variety of natural resources, yet the 
level of development in these provinces does not mirror this rich resource 
base. This imbalance can be attributed partially to the centralised 
approaches of exploiting natural resources, which have defined resource 
extraction and utilisation since independence at the expense of local com-
munities. Real vertical power-sharing will ensure that local communities 
have direct access to the resources within their respective communities, so 
they can define their own development. Development projects led by the 
people themselves are likely to be more sustainable than those imposed by 
central government. Another benefit associated with vertical power-shar-
ing is that it encourages competition, innovation and experimentation 
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among subnational and local governments, which may result in the devel-
opment of superior public policies that can make a positive impact on 
development objectives.
 Keeping the Nation Together
For a while, Zimbabwe has been polarised primarily along political lines. 
This polarisation is beginning to adversely impact national integration and 
peace. Signs of one of the most dangerous forms of polarisation, ethnic 
polarisation, are also emerging. The key question is what will keep the 
national together. Vertical power-sharing can be a potential solution, given 
that it creates an environment that allows geographically concentrated 
groups to determine and shape those issues that immediately affect their 
lives (Chigwata 2018: 5). The potential for this is high in countries where 
ethnic groups are geographically concentrated in certain areas, such as 
Zimbabwe, where almost everyone has a province and local authority area 
that they call home. Most minority ethnic groups, such as the Ndebele, 
Venda and Tonga, are geographically concentrated in certain provinces, 
usually along border areas. Even the subethnic groups of the dominant 
Shona are geographically concentrated in certain areas. This concentration 
of ethnic groups, especially in border areas, increases the risk for secession. 
However, the potential for this can be neutralised by real vertical power- 
sharing, which creates an environment where local interests can be accom-
modated ‘within the stability of a strong central authority’ (Hatchard et al. 
2004: 185). The resultant multilevel system of government prevents a 
winner takes all situation, since political power can still be exercised not 
just at national but also at subnational and local levels (Manor 2013: 33). 
Vertical power-sharing has a high chance of accommodating a diversity of 
interests. Thus, governmental powers and resources should be diffused 
not only to subnational governments but also to the people.
Lessons from the past show that Zimbabwe needs to do away with 
an over-centralised system of government. The big advantage is that the 
2013 Constitution, while not perfect, provides a foundation upon which a 
devolved system of government can be built. This shift towards a devolved 
system of government ‘is premised on the fundamental belief that once 
they are entrusted with their own destiny through the medium of pop-
ular local democratic institutions, human beings can govern themselves 
in peace and dignity in pursuit of their collective well- being’ (Hatchard 
et  al. 2004: 185). Zimbabwe has much to gain if it adopts a devolved 
system of government which can be accommodated in a unitary form of 
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government. It should, however, be acknowledged that a multilevel sys-
tem of government requires significant state capacity, which is currently 
not available (see Manor 2013: 32). Nevertheless, the absence of signifi-
cant state capacity should not be the reason why centralisation should be 
adopted, as a capacity-building process can run parallel to the process of 
devolution.
International Integration
Ever since Zimbabwe embarked on the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme in the early 2000s, its relations with multilateral institutions 
and western countries have been sour. It has defaulted on several of its 
debt obligations. The country has isolated itself from the west preferring 
to engage with the east. As a result, and unlike some of its African coun-
terparts, Zimbabwe has not been able to access financial support from the 
multilateral institutions and to attract significant budgetary support from 
the western countries. Yet the country badly needs a cash injection to 
stimulate its faltering economy. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 128) argues that 
‘[i]n this century of globalisation, it is impossible for any nation, including 
the developed West, to try and isolate itself even in a “splendid isolation” 
fashion from the complex web and framework of the international com-
munity’. Even the eastern countries that Zimbabwe has been dealing with 
for the past two decades do business with the west. Zimbabwe does not 
have the luxury to choose which countries to deal with given its precarious 
economic situation. Thus, ‘the way forward for Zimbabwe lies in return-
ing to the diplomatic chessboard and to bargain from within, rather than 
to adopt a belligerent stance against the international community’ 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003: 129). Zimbabwe has no choice but to reenter 
the international family of nations by normalising relations with multilat-
eral institutions and the west. The settling of debt obligations and improv-
ing its human rights record are some of the many measures that can have 
a positive impact on Zimbabwe’s relations with international actors.
conclusIon
Zimbabwe has experienced several decades of political and economic chal-
lenges that can largely be attributed to the political and economic choices 
of the ruling elites. Very few in the ruling ZANU–PF or close to the party 
are willing to acknowledge their role in or take the blame for Zimbabwe’s 
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economic and political crisis. Some of them attribute the economic crisis 
to sanctions or restrictions imposed on Zimbabwe by the west, thereby 
choosing to ignore the impact of corruption and mismanagement, among 
other ills, that have bedevilled the country for several decades. The coun-
try is endowed with rich resources, both natural and human, that are 
needed to reboot economic development. In 2013, Zimbabwe adopted a 
new Constitution that is progressive in many respects and provides a foun-
dation for Zimbabwe to move forward. According to Ndlovu- Gatsheni ( 
2003: 129) What the country has been lacking is ‘a flexible, malleable and 
visionary leadership capable of charting a new dispensation not clouded in 
bankrupt ideologies, but consonant with the prevailing local, regional and 
international developments’. The fall of Robert Mugabe in November 
2017 provided an opportunity for the country to break from its ugly past 
and set a new development path. Mugabe’s successor, Emmerson 
Mnangagwa, announced himself on the international stage as a reformist 
willing to change the political and economic course that has led the former 
bread basket of Southern Africa to a basket case. He announced the birth 
of a ‘Second Republic’ characterised by clean governance, an open busi-
ness environment and widened scope for the exercise of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms. The change process has, however, been slow 
and painful, making it indistinguishable from the old dispensation. Unless 
the new administration begins to walk the talk of change, Zimbabwe will 
remain a basket case. What is required is a governance culture where polit-
ical, private and individual interests do not thrive at the expense of the 
public good.
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